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7.8 -- 6.2 =  1,716,000 
No profession has suffered as much of  a cred-
ibility problem in recent years as the econo-
mics  profession.  Hand-wringing,  brow-
furrowing economists for several years 
cautioned  an  unconcerned  "spend-while-
you-have-it" public that a recession was just 
around the corner. And quarter after quarter, 
the corner remained the same distance away. 
Even in late 1979, economists continued to 
suggest that the recession would be a mild 
one, because of such factors as the conserva-
tive inventory behavior of businessmen. For 
example, the National Association of 
Business Economists forecast last October 
that the unemployment rate this year would 
average 7.2 percent. But as we have seen, the 
jobless rate jumped from 6.2 percent to 7.B 
percent just between March and May of  this 
year-meaning (as the caption notes) a 
l.7-million increase in the number of unem-
ployed, on a seasonally-adjusted basis. And 
once again, economists across the nation 
have tried in vain to find an explanation for 
their inability to forecast and explain major 
econom  ic events. 
In their defense, economists argue that the 
structure of  the u.s. economy has changed in 
many ways which are not well understood-
one particular area being the labor market. 
Aggregate inflation (the rise in the overall 
price level) and the substantial increase in the 
relative price of  energy-intensive productive 
inputs both have strongly affected the u.s. 
labor market and changed our notion of  what 
constitutes fu II employment. 
What's "full employment"? 
Total employment increased very substan-
tially, by 12.1  million, in the business expan-
sion which began in the first quarter of 1975 
and ended in the first quarter of  this year. 
Nonetheless, the unemployment rate never 
fell below 5.7 percent in that entire period, 
largely because of a parallel rise in the total 
labor force. The same phenomenon has con-
tinued into 19BO. Of  the increase in jobless-
ness since January, 900,000 represent an 
increase in the laborforce, while BOO,OOO are 
due to a decline in employment. 
The civilian labor-force partiCipation rate 
rose steadily through the 1975-79  expansion 
and even into the ensuing recession, reaching 
64.2 percent this May, the highest ever. This 
rise reflected an increase in women's partici-
pation rate, from 45.6 percent in 1974 to 51.0 
percent in 1979, which contrastedyvith a 
modest decline in men's participation rate. 
Yet even with the sizable increase in the 
number available for work, the number with 
jobs hit record levels, as an unprecedented 
(for peacetime) 59.3 percent ofthe adu It non-
institutional population held jobs in 1979. 
Butto repeat, the jobless rate failed to decl  i  ne 
below 5.7 percent throughout the prolonged 
expansion, despite the vast expansion of 
employment. Economists, and even some 
policymakers, began to question why the 
measured unemployment rate was so high in 
a period when the economy was apparently 
fully employed. And this raises a related 
question: if we cannot measure accurately 
the "full employment" unemployment rate, 
how can we tell today what a high unemploy-
ment rate is? 
Oil prices and labor demand 
The strong employment gains of  the past half-
decade cou Id  be traced in part to the 1973-
74 oil price shock, which reduced the relative 
cost of labor inputs, particularly in manufac-
turing, and raised the cost of utilizing the 
existing capital stock. The quadrupling of 
OPEC oi I prices affected the U.S. economy in 
two ways, through an "income effect" and 
through a "substitution effect." Under the 
income effect, the OPEC nations place a tax 
on U.s. consumers which could only be par-
tially recouped from OPEC purchases of U.S. 
goods-that is they forced a change in the 
U.S. "terms of  trade." That loss could not easily be circumvented by an expansion of 
government spending or a speed-up in 
money-supply growth. But under the substi-
tution effect, labor at the margin became a 
relatively less expensive input, because of  the 
rise in the cost of energy-intensive capital. 
The rise in energy prices thus tended to in-
crease the demand for labor, so that the 
economy became more labor intensive. 
According to Edward A. Hudson and Dale W. 
Jorgenson (Natural Resources Journal, 1978), 
the 1973-74 rise in energy prices helped 
account for the subsequent slow recovery in 
business capital spending and very substan-
tial increase in total employment. But for that 
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rise in energy prices, they argued, the unem-
ployment rate would have reached 10.3 per-
cent in 1976 rather than the 7.7 -percent rate 
actually experienced. The difference repre-
sented the substitution effect towards labor 
that resulted from the first oil shock. 
Real-wage behavior 
The unexpected rise in U.S. labor demand in 
the recent business expansion thus reflected a 
decline in the real (inflation adjusted) wage 
rate. Conversely, the major and prolonged 
unemployment problems experienced by 
other major industrial nations in that same 
period reflected a rise in their real wage rate. 
Between 1973 and 1975, real hourly com-
pensation in U.S. manufacturing grew atonly 
an O.B-percent average annual rate, com-
pared with a 1.S-percent average rise 
between 1969 and 1973.ln contrast, German 
real wages continued to grow in excess of 7 
percent after the first round of oil price in-
creases, and real wages in the U.K. and 
Canada rose at an even faster rate. Not sur-
prisingly, then, the u.s. experienced sharp 
increases in manufacturing employment in 
the 1976-78 period, following a decline after 
the initial price shock. Germany, in contrast, 
experienced declines in manufacturing em-
ployment in every year from 1974 to 1978, wh  i  Ie the U.  K. and Canada showed very little 
employment  growth. Real wage behavior ac-
counted for the difference. 
The behavior of employment in the nation's 
current recession will again depend on the 
behavior of real wages. The latest oil-price 
hike and the double-digit inflation have 
seriously reduced real spendable income, 
and this will surely reduce aggregate de-
mand. Yet if  wage earners attempt to recoup 
all of their losses with large wage bargaining 
demands, they may not be as successful in 
expanding employment as they were inthe 
1975-79 period. 
Any lessons learned? 
For policy purposes, it is necessary for us to 
determine how much of  the recent jump in 
the unemployment rate-from 6.2 percent in 
March to 7.8 percent in May-is  due to in-
creased energy prices, and how much to the 
inflation-caused reduction in workers' in-
comes. The latest OPEC-generated rise in 
energy prices certa i  n  Iy wi  II have some u  nem-
ployment effects, similar to those caused by 
the 1973-74 oil price rise. But we can also 
anticipate a longer-run rise in total employ-
ment because of increased energy prices, 
reflecting a substitution effect such as we ex-
perienced during the 1975-79 period. 
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Moreover the increase in the ratio of  labor per 
unit of capital may mean also an increase in 
the level of unemployment associated with a 
fully-employed U.S. economy. Our recent 
experience with double-digit inflation and 
soaring interest rates may force us to revise 
our estimates of what constitutes sustainable 
full employment. It may also mean that 
during the current recession the unemploy-
ment rate may be higher than previously for 
the same reduction in real output growth. 
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
large Commercial Banl<s 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total # 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Weekly Averages 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (+  )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (+  )/Net borrowed(  - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  .  Percent 
8,376  6.5 
9,706  9.2 
1,902  6.1 
8,644  22.9 
1,612  7.3 
343  -21.1 
1,507  - 19.5 
177  1.2 
805  1.9 
943  3.0 
3,005  - 10.0 
14,503  29.4 
14,289  35.3 
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